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Expanding Access to Patents for
COVID-19
Jorge L. Contreras, JD, University of Utah S.J. Quinney College of Law; Department of Human Genetics,
University of Utah School of Medicine
SUMMARY. Two competing and linked sets of goals must be addressed when considering patent policy in
response to a public health emergency. First is the allocation of existing resources among potential users
(hospitals, patients, etc.); second is the creation of new technologies over time (innovation). Patents provide
financial incentives to develop new technologies. Yet shortages of patented products often plague crisis
response. In the case of COVID-19, allocative goals, particularly satisfying demand for patented medical
products (e.g., vaccines, ventilators, PPE, and test kits), may be achieved through governmental interventions
such as march-in and governmental use rights (compulsory licensing). But in cases involving the development
of new technologies such as vaccines and therapies, incentive structures must be preserved to ensure
that the private sector is appropriately motivated to act. In addition to patents, which reward inventors for
financially successful innovations, a range of other incentives such as prizes, grants, and subsidies also
exist to motivate technological innovation. Incentives like these, coupled with a requirement that resulting
discoveries be made available on a broad and open basis, can achieve a balance between allocation and
innovation goals. Governments can encourage such measures using both the incipient threat of compulsory
licensing and the reward of procurement preferences and other up-front rewards.
Introduction

As COVID-19 spread around the world in early 2020, reports
emerged of patent-based threats against manufacturers of
products – such as ventilator valves and diagnostic test kits –
needed to address the emerging public health crisis. Countries
including Germany, France, Israel, and Canada rushed to enact
policies to suspend patent rights on vaccines and drugs that could
be used to combat the pandemic. Echoing concerns over the
inaccessibility of patented vaccine technologies during the SARS
and Ebola outbreaks, the World Health Organization (WHO) issued a
global call to action, urging governments and the private sector to
make patents broadly available in the fight against COVID-19. This
Chapter offers a framework for U.S. policymakers as they consider
different responses to COVID-19 that may implicate patented
technologies.

Patents and the “Access versus Incentives” Tradeoff

Two competing sets of goals must be addressed when considering
patent policy. Allocative considerations relate to the distribution
of existing resources among potential users. In terms of many
patented technologies – e.g., smart phones, aircraft engines,
food additives – market forces do a pretty good job of allocating
products to those who value them most highly (Landes & Posner,
2003). However, in some cases, simple market action may not
achieve desired policy goals. Thus, in the case of patented drugs
and health care equipment, considerations such as distributive
justice, public health, health equity, and humanitarianism may

lead policymakers to consider interventions designed to promote
greater public access to these technologies than the market alone
would provide (Outterson, 2005; Lee, 2017). Such interventions
may seek to influence product demand (e.g., by subsidizing users
through public assistance programs like Medicare and Medicaid)
or supply (e.g., by relaxing patent restrictions in order to enable a
wider range of suppliers to produce the desired product and offer
it at a reduced price (often referred to as compulsory licensing –
see below)).
Unlike allocative considerations, dynamic considerations relate to
the creation of new technologies over time. Patents are designed
to promote innovation, as they provide financial incentives to
producers of successful new technologies (at least those that
are valued by the market). In addition to patents, other incentive
mechanisms exist to encourage innovation, including grants,
prizes, and tax incentives (Hemel & Ouellette, 2019). In many cases,
several of these incentives can work in tandem (e.g., a grantfunded project that leads to a patentable invention and gives its
owner the benefit of a research and development (R&D) tax credit).
These factors do not exist independently of one another, and
interventions with respect to one will often affect the other. In
some cases, allocative interventions may promote innovation,
as when the government subsidizes individual purchases of a
patented drug, thereby ensuring patient access to the drug while
at the same time rewarding its developer and funding future
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research. Yet, in other cases, allocative interventions such as
compulsory licensing of patents (described below), may depress
an innovator’s financial returns and thus reduce its incentive to
innovate further. This “access versus incentives” tradeoff is one
of the fundamental tensions in intellectual property law (Landes &
Posner, 2003; Outterson, 2005; Hemel & Ouellette, 2019). And while
such tradeoffs can be justified in the pursuit of legitimate policy
goals, it is important for policymakers to understand their nature
and extent when considering different policy interventions. This
Chapter briefly outlines policy considerations surrounding access
and incentive policy interventions pertinent to COVID-19.

Access to Existing Technologies

Once a particular technology exists, there is no further need to
incentivize its creation. While it may be desirable to incentivize
the creation of improvements and follow-on innovations, policy
decisions largely shift to allocative issues (access). Compulsory
licensing is a legal mechanism designed to increase access to
patented technologies that are being undersupplied by the market
(i.e., by the patent holder and its delegates). When imposing
a compulsory license, the government effectively requires a
patent holder to license its patents to one or more third party
manufacturers (usually at a reasonable rate) in order to ensure
the continuity of, or an increase in, production and supply of the
patented technology.
Unlike many countries, the United States lacks a general statutory
framework for the compulsory licensing of patented technologies.
However, U.S. law does possess two statutory mechanisms that
achieve similar results: federal march-in rights under the BayhDole Act of 1980 (35 U.S.C. § 301 et seq.) and governmental use
under 28 U.S.C. § 1498. These two mechanisms are explained below.
March-In Rights under the Bayh-Dole Act
The Bayh-Dole Act of 1980 allows researchers to patent inventions
arising from federally-funded research. In return, the Act
authorizes the government to exercise so-called ‘march in’ rights,
which compel the owner of any such patent to license it to one or
more third parties to the extent necessary, among other things, to
address health or safety needs. Numerous petitions have been filed
over the years urging federal agencies to exercise their march-in
rights under the Act, primarily in cases involving undersupplied or
costly pharmaceutical products (Thomas, 2016). To date, however,
neither the National Institutes of Health nor any other federal
agency has exercised march-in rights under the Act.
While the federal government has been urged to exercise its
Bayh-Dole march-in rights in the context of the COVID-19 response
(e.g., with respect to vaccine technologies partially funded
through federal programs), march-in rights have limitations. Most
importantly, they apply only to inventions that were made using
federal funding. While many vaccine and drug candidates have
arisen from grant-funded university laboratories, a significant
amount of biomedical research is conducted in the private sector
without federal support. Nevertheless, march-in rights under
the Bayh-Dole Act are valuable tools that have the potential to
lift patent barriers that might impede the supply of at least some
needed goods and services.

Governmental Use
Section 1498 of chapter 28 of the United States Code is not
a compulsory licensing law, but a limited waiver by the U.S.
government of its sovereign immunity. Under this statute, if the
federal government (itself or through its contractors) uses or
manufactures a patented invention without the permission of
the owner, the owner cannot prevent this use, but may sue the
government to recover “reasonable and entire compensation” in the
U.S. Court of Federal Claims.
Since its enactment in the early 20th century, the federal
government has periodically invoked § 1498 in cases relating to the
procurement of military and other equipment. Less frequently,
§ 1498 has been used to bolster the U.S. supply of drugs and
biomedical technologies at prices lower than those charged
by patent holders. During a three-year period in the 1960s, the
Department of Defense’s Military Medical Supply Agency (MMSA)
utilized § 1498 to obtain supplies of approximately 50 drugs
including the antibiotic tetracycline (Brennan et al., 2016). Though
the federal government’s use of § 1498 in the pharmaceutical
sector declined by the 1970s, the Department of Health and Human
Services threatened to invoke the statute in 2001 during the post9/11 anthrax scare (Brennan et al., 2016). Since then, commentators
have proposed using the government’s powers under § 1498 to drive
down drug prices, but no meaningful utilization of this power has
occurred for pharmaceutical products in nearly two decades.
But today, with highly publicized shortages of coronavirus testing
kits, facial masks, ventilators, and other critical supplies, the
prospect of U.S. government intervention through § 1498 has again
gained traction. Section 1498 is a viable mechanism for addressing
pandemic-related shortages of any product or service required by
the federal government or its contractors.
Commentators who have analyzed the use of § 1498 in connection
with the supply of drugs have expressed concern over its limited
scope: it only applies to products that are “used or manufactured
by or for the United States” (Brennan et al., 2016). In the context of
ordinary prescription drugs, this scope might not be broad enough
to address the needs of patients whose drug costs are covered by
private insurers or health plans. However, the case for government
use (and the applicability of § 1498) is stronger in the context of
the new coronavirus, which the federal government has declared
a national emergency. To the extent the federal government
supports, procures, distributes, or administers coronavirus
tests, vaccines, treatments, or equipment, such activity could be
classified as government use under the terms of § 1498.

Incentivizing the Development of New (and Open)
Technologies

While existing technologies are largely (though not entirely) the
subject of allocative/access policy interventions, a different
calculus exists with respect to as-yet-undiscovered technologies.
In these cases, the focus is largely on incentivizing the discovery/
creation of the new technology, whether it be a vaccine, a
therapeutic, or a medical device. Under ordinary circumstances,
patents are effective mechanisms for incentivizing innovation: if
granted, they allow the inventor to extract rent from the market
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over a multi-year period without close competition. In the case of
new prescription drugs, patents enable manufacturers to recoup
far more than even their substantial R&D costs. As an intervention,
patents do not impose a direct cost on the government (though
when government programs purchase patented drugs, they
effectively subsidize the inventor), and they generally reward
innovations that are successful in the market, eliminating any need
to evaluate their quality independently.
However, patents are not always well-calibrated to address social
needs. Because their payoff is entirely market-driven, patents
incentivize innovations that are likely to be the most lucrative,
rather than the most beneficial (hence the tendency of some
firms to focus R&D dollars on hair loss treatments and diet pills
rather than the eradication of rare diseases). In normal times,
governments can seek to guide innovation in socially beneficial
directions through a variety of incentive mechanisms: extended
periods of market exclusivity for ‘orphan drugs’ directed to
rare diseases, research grants targeted at diseases affecting
underserved populations, and the like. But in times of emergency,
more urgent measures may be required.
Prizes for Open Innovation
In addition to patents, mechanisms such as grants, subsidies,
tax incentives, and prizes are used to incentivize innovation.
The field of vaccine development offers a useful illustration. In
general, vaccine development does not begin until a particular
disease strain is identified and recognized as a significant threat
(Rutschman, 2018). Patents are often held by diverse entities,
making consolidation and effective R&D difficult (Rutschman, 2018;
Rutschman 2019). Moreover, vaccines are generally viewed as less
profitable than therapeutic drugs, further contributing to their
lack of development (Rutschman, 2019; Xue & Ouellette, 2020).
And while the number of patents covering vaccine technologies
continues to rise, vaccine development is still severely lacking
(Rutschman, 2019).
The problem of optimizing vaccine development is dynamic
— it relates not to the allocation of existing resources, but to
the creation of new ones. To incentivize vaccine development
during a major disease outbreak, some commentators have
proposed increasing monetary incentives for successfully
producing a vaccine in the form of substantial grants, subsidies,
or prizes (Lichtman, 2018; Xue & Ouellette, 2020). An important
condition of such financial incentives could be a requirement
that the awardee make any resulting patents openly available
to the public, at least for purposes of COVID-19 response. This
requirement would “open” patents for all to use in connection
with the present emergency, thus addressing allocative issues,
while at the same time permitting the innovator to monetize the
invention in other fields and settings (i.e., therapies for diseases
other than COVID-19), thereby reducing impediments to dynamic
innovation (see, e.g., the Open COVID Pledge (opencovidpledge.
org), which allows a patent holder to pledge its technology for
free usage in addressing the COVID-19 pandemic, while retaining
the right to charge for it elsewhere).

Encouraging Patent Pools
According to some accounts, the largest barrier to effective
vaccine development is not insufficient funding during an outbreak
(when funding often increases dramatically), but the inability of
diverse patent holders to cooperate to productively combine their
technologies (Rutschman, 2018; Rutschman, 2019). Accordingly, the
twin issues of rights fragmentation and lack of coordination must
be addressed (Heller & Eisenberg, 1998).
One well-known method for addressing these related issues is the
pooling of patents held by multiple parties – making those patents
available as a group to others in the industry. In cases of national
emergency, government can encourage (or pressure) private
parties to participate in such arrangements. This approach was
famously employed in the months prior to U.S. entry into World
War I. At that time, “the development of the aircraft industry in
the United States was seriously retarded by the existence of
a chaotic situation concerning the validity and ownership of
important aeronautical patents” (“MAA v. United States,” 1933).
Fearing that the military would be unable to procure sufficient
aircraft, government officials pressured the two leading holders
of aviation patents, Wright-Martin and Curtiss-Burgess, to pool
their patents with the rest of the industry, thereby alleviating fears
throughout the industry that the manufacture of aircraft would lead
to litigation.
Patent pools have been proposed in connection with viral
outbreaks before, including the 2002-03 SARS outbreak, the 2005
H5N1 influenza outbreak, and the 2009 H1N1 influenza pandemic.
Yet, despite the perceived need for aggregation of distributed
patent rights in order to combat these diseases, patent pools were
never formed for a variety of practical and competitive reasons. In
March 2020, the government of Costa Rica called on the WHO to
form a patent pool relating to COVID-19. Such a pool, which could
address a range of technologies beyond vaccines, would clearly be
beneficial to public health.
In the United States, the government could encourage the
formation of one or more COVID-19 pools using a carrot and stick
approach. On one hand (the stick), government can threaten to
enact compulsory licensing mechanisms to compel patent holders
to make their patents available to competitors if they do not
voluntarily accede to such a pool. On the other hand (the carrot),
government can commit to procure relevant medical products only
from participants in such pools.

Conclusion

Formulating patent policy to address public health crises involves
both allocative considerations as well as incentives for innovation.
Neither can be ignored, so solutions that achieve some balance
between broad access to patented technologies and incentives for
future technology development are needed. Fortunately, several
such approaches are available in the area of COVID-19 response
and remediation.
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Recommendations for Action
Federal government:
• The federal government, acting
through the Centers for Disease
Control or another appropriate agency,
should assess the patent landscape
for technologies critical to COVID-19
response, including the licensing
practices of key patent holders,
and identify any areas in which the
combination of patent protection
and a demonstrated unwillingness of
patent holders to make their rights
available to others could plausibly
hinder the rapid development and
deployment of technologies necessary
to combat the pandemic.
• With respect to such patents,
the government should develop
and publish a plan for asserting
governmental use and march-in rights
under 28 U.S.C. § 1498 and the BayhDole Act, with the proviso that any
patent holder that voluntarily pledges
its patents for COVID-19 response on a
broad, royalty-free basis (e.g., the Open
COVID Pledge) would not be subject to
such measures.

State governments:
• In areas key to COVID-19 response,
state governments should select
technology targets requiring further
research and development and develop
incentive programs (e.g., prizes,
grants, subsidies) to encourage their
development, with the proviso that any
resulting technologies should be made
available under broad, royalty-free
terms (e.g., the Open COVID Pledge) for
purposes of COVID-19 response.
• The government should encourage
users of complementary patents to form
patent pools, and commit to procuring
products and supplies only from entities
participating in such pools.

• In areas key to COVID-19 response, the
government should select technology
targets requiring further research
and development and develop
incentive programs (e.g., prizes,
grants, subsidies) to encourage their
development, with the proviso that any
resulting technologies should be made
available under broad, royalty-free
terms (e.g., the Open COVID Pledge) for
purposes of COVID-19 response.
• The government should encourage
users of complementary patents to form
patent pools, and commit to procuring
products and supplies only from entities
participating in such pools.
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